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Abstract:
This paper discusses the re-emergence of biofuel innovation systems in the United States and 
Brazil. We argue that innovation systems emerge and evolve to solve a problem, and that the 
way the  problem is  framed and  articulated  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  direction  and 
momentum of this evolution.  Additionally, innovation sequences occur with a recurrent pattern 
of changing problems and innovative solutions.  We consider the role of the State as a core 
actor  in  the  mobilisation  of  innovation  systems  and  discuss  how  specific  institutional 
arrangements, political contexts and technological competencies influence how problems are 
framed.   We  find  that  role  of  the  State  varies  across  time  as  well  as  across  different 
geographical regions. Finally, we suggest that as ecological problems intensify we might expect 
to see an increase in State intervention in innovation systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the United States (U.S.) and Brazil  produced almost exactly the same volume of 
bioethanol for use as a transport fuel. The oil shocks of the early 1970s provided the impetus 
for both countries to embark on developing these new productive capabilities, but the paths 
that have been followed since the 1970s to achieve this historical moment of convergence 
could hardly have differed more.  Since 2005, the volume of biofuel production has continued 
to increase significantly in the U.S., principally for domestic consumption, and has overtaken 
Brazilian supply capacity, which has continued to grow with a new orientation towards the 
creation of an international export market.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the contrasting biofuel innovation trajectories of the 
U.S. and Brazil.  We discuss the emergence and evolution of innovation sequences in each 
country to explain differences in terms of the rate and direction of biofuel production capacity. 
That Brazil would choose sugar cane as its principal source of biomass, while the U.S. has 
chosen corn is perhaps obvious. That the bioethanol sectors of both countries originated at 
roughly the same time, just after the oil shock of 1973, also appears straightforward. But, why 
did the U.S. fall behind, while the Brazilian biofuel sector grew?  Why, subsequently, did the 
U.S. embark on a rapid expansion initiative in the early 2000s? What were the respective roles 
of governments in each case and what novel modes of industrial organisation emerged? We 
answer these questions by suggesting that the innovation sequences in each country were 
oriented  towards  solving  different  types  of  problems.  The  relative  political  importance  of 
energy security, economic growth opportunities and combating climate change as drivers of 
innovation has played a significant role in producing the observed variation.  As such, a key 
concern in our analysis is to develop a stronger understanding of how political responses to 
different types of problem have been translated into specific policy instruments to stimulate 
the rate and direction of biofuel innovation. We also seek explanations for how the new biofuel 
industrial  regimes in each country differ in terms of long standing institutional differences, 
perhaps most clearly in evidence when comparing the role of the state-owned oil company, 
Petrobras of Brazil, with its North American counterparts, as agents of innovation.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, we introduce a framework for 
analysing  the  issues  raised  above,  drawing  on  the  concepts  of  innovation  sequences  and 
systems.  The  following  two  sections  present  our  case  studies  of  the  U.S.  and  Brazilian 
experiences with biofuels. The final section presents our analysis and discussion.
2 SEQUENCES AND SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION
The concept of  the innovation system is now widely used to explain interactions between 
technological change and economic development, especially amongst those with a preference 
for evolutionary explanations. In its recent incarnation, the approach was used to describe 
national  specificities  in  institutional  arrangements  to  explain  variability  in  innovation 
performance across countries (Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall,  1992). Subsequent 
analysis has delineated the system by a particular technology (Carlsson, 1997; Jacobsson and 
Bergek,  2004;  Hekkert  et  al,  2007)  or  a  sector  (Malerba,  2002).    These  alternative 
approaches  differ  according  to  whether  national  institutions,  specific  characteristics  of 
technologies or economic specificities of particular sectors are considered the dominant logic 
underpinning the dynamics and evolution of the innovation system under investigation. Later 
work, especially Markard and Truffer (2008), usefully combine the approaches to suggest ways 
in which innovation dynamics can draw influence from all three spheres. 
This later approach is consistent with other contributions that have explicitly argued against 
the  imposition  of  a  priori  boundaries  to  the  analysis  of  innovation  systems,  preferring  to 
understand them as unfolding in scale and scope over time (Coombs  et al, 2003). In other 
words, their geographical reach, sectoral orientation, and technological content evolve as part 
of the innovation process itself. Boundaries are a transient outcome of the process, always 
subject to potential revision. An approach that provides a useful development to the concept of 
innovation systems in this respect, is the idea that they are problem oriented (Metcalfe and 
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Ramlogan, 2008). Understanding innovation systems as problem orientated, (i.e. that they are 
formed to solve problems), provides dynamism and direction to the system: resources and 
capabilities  are  mobilised  and  coordinated  in  order  to  find  a  solution  to  the  problem. 
Furthermore, since the problem is itself a moving target, the system evolves in response. In 
particular, a solution for one problem almost inevitably produces a new or modified problem 
and a renewed search for solutions.  Thus innovation sequences occur with a recurrent pattern 
of changing problems and innovative solutions.  
In this description of how innovation systems emerge and evolve to solve a problem (e.g. 
Metcalfe  and  Ramlogan,  2008),  surprisingly  little  has  been  said  about  how problems  are 
themselves constructed. Typically, it is implied that the problem is a functional one, associated 
with a fairly well described societal  need. In the medical realm, for example, the problem 
sequences for cataracts (Metcalfe et al, 2005), coronary artery disease (Mina et al, 2007), or 
for HIV (Merito and Bonaccorsi, 2007) take the disease itself, in terms of its physiological 
symptoms and causes, as the problem to be solved. The solutions that are observed as the 
problem sequence unfolds are concerned with the ‘physical  technologies’  of  the respective 
therapies themselves and the ‘social technologies’ that account for how the new treatment is 
provisioned in the context of clinical practice (Nelson, 2005). 
But the functional problems that innovation systems are mobilised to solve are interwoven with 
social, economic and political factors and these can play a significant role in how the innovation 
system is constructed. The history of the origins of electricity for widespread use, as recounted 
by Hughes (1983) illustrates the ‘seamless web’ of technical, economic and political factors 
that formed ‘reverse salients’ in the otherwise growing system and their associated ‘critical 
problems’ to be solved by engineers. A reverse salient is a term borrowed from the military, 
and refers to sections of the advancing front line which fall behind.  Hughes chose this term, as 
opposed to bottleneck, for example, to emphasise the complexity framing a problem where 
individuals, groups, material forces and historical influences all play idiosyncratic causal roles. 
In his  framework the articulation  of  a  problem often defines  its  solution,  reverse salients 
become defined as a series as critical problems, and innovative activity is directed towards 
solving these problems.
This  elaboration of  how to  conceptualise  the nature of  problems that  are  to  be solved is 
significant for the present analysis. As we shall see, the functional need that biofuels seek to 
attend to is  concerned with the movement of  people and goods, as an energy source for 
transportation. At this level, biofuels compete with other viable transportation technologies. 
But because the problem has been constructed in different ways in different places, we have 
identified significant variation in the constitution of the emergent innovation sequences. They 
all share the goal of seeking to provide an alternative to oil as a transport fuel, but differ in the 
interweaving of specific motivations and supplementary conditions for doing so.  
There are some similarities between the approach that we are proposing and the multilevel 
perspective for  understanding technological  transitions (Geels, 2002, Kemp, 1994). In that 
framework, the landscape represents the rather inert and slow changing macro-institutional 
arrangements that constrain or facilitate changes in a technological regime (which is itself also 
constituted by institutional factors, this time at the meso-level). For our current purposes, 
changes in the relative importance of different political drivers for biofuel innovation would 
presumably be constitutive of landscape dynamics. Correspondingly, we might also assume 
that  major  regional  differences  in  the  political  negotiation  and  prioritisation  of  societal 
problems to be addressed by innovation policy suggest multiple co-existing regime changes 
affected by significantly  different  landscape dynamics.  In our language,  the emergence of 
multiple and different innovation sequences reflects significant differences in the definition of 
the  problems  that  they  are  seeking  to  solve.  This,  in  turn,  suggests  that  an  important 
component of the analysis is the need to account for the different roles that the State has as a 
core actor in the mobilisation of innovation systems. 
Therefore, the final strand of our analytical approach focuses on the respective roles of public 
and private actors in emergent innovation systems and on the market and non-market forms 
of  coordination  that  account  for  how knowledge  and  resources  are  exchanged  within  the 
system.  We are suggesting a form of analysis that goes beyond the focus on how government 
policy facilitates the functions of innovation systems (Hekkert  et al, 2007) or influences the 
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performance of private innovation actors by establishing the appropriate incentive structures. 
To do this, we follow contributions which have described varieties of capitalist political economy 
(for  example,  Hall  and Soskice,  2001).  We adopt  a  view that  innovation  is  a  multimodal 
economic process, involving the coordinated action of public and private actors in market and 
non-market modes of interaction (Harvey et al, 2002; Harvey and McMeekin, 2007).   In this 
approach, the focus is on comparative and historical variation.  The varieties of capitalism, that 
are manifestly different in Brazil and the U.S., play a key role in explaining the institutional and 
organisational arrangements constructing the problem and subsequently generating solutions. 
To summarise, the approach that we are developing to analyse and compare the unfolding 
biofuel innovation sequences in the U.S. and Brazil foregrounds the following considerations: 
1. Innovation  systems  emerge  and  evolve  in  relation  to  the  changing  nature  of  the 
problem that they have been mobilised to solve; 
2. Innovation  systems  are  characterised  by  interactions  between  States  and  private 
enterprise in market and non-market modes of economic governance.
In adopting this type of approach we will try to make sense of the contrasting institutional 
arrangements in Brazil and the U.S. for incentivising, structuring and organising innovation and 
the importance of path dependencies relating to pre-existing organisational capabilities. We 
believe that  this  approach will  be  particularly  useful  for  explaining differences in  how the 
roughly  similar  volumes  of  bio-ethanol  in  2005  were  produced  in  significantly  different 
institutional and organisational terms and why this came about as a result of the respective 
innovation systems being oriented towards different problem specifications.
2.1 Sequences and Systems of Biofuel Innovation
Before describing in detail the emergence of biofuel innovation systems in Brazil and the U.S., 
it is worth signalling a couple of issues that perhaps mark out this technological transition as 
quite atypical. It is not, as has been the case in many historical examples, an example of a 
new  technological  regime  that  from  its  inception  commanded  an  obvious performance 
advantage  over  the  incumbent  regime.   Furthermore,  the  account  of  how  (physical) 
technologies provoke change in institutional arrangements (social technologies) requires some 
careful consideration in this situation where the foundational technological capabilities have 
been in existence for well over one hundred years.  We argue that the framing of politically 
important problems has been fundamental to the resurrection of dormant biofuel capabilities, 
and discuss how the interpretation and articulation of problems has varied across place and 
over time.  Then, with the contrasting problem specifications of different regions and times 
established,  we  can  analyse how they have  shaped and been shaped by their  associated 
emergent technological, organisational and institutional configurations.
3 METHODOLOGY
The country specific case studies reported in this paper are part of a broader project; ‘The 
transition  to  a  sustainable  bioeconomy:  innovation  and  expectations’  comparing  emerging 
bioeconomies in  Europe,  the USA and Brazil.    As  part  of  an extensive primary research 
programme we conducted semi-structured interviews during 2008 and early 2009 with key 
industrial and academic players in the U.S. and Brazil.  In Brazil (19 interviews), we conducted 
interviews in Rio de Janeiro (Petrobras, university, government officials), Campinas (sugarcane 
biotechnology  companies,  scientists),  and  Piracicaba  (biorefinery,  bioethanol  companies, 
scientists).  In North America (14 interviews), we conducted interviews in Ottawa (cellulosic 
ethanol producer), Chicago and the mid-West (bioethanol producers, major agricultural firms, 
scientists),  and  the  East  coast  (cellulosic  ethanol  producers).   Prior,  and  parallel,  to  the 
interview stage, we undertook qualitative institutional analysis and extensive secondary data 
analysis  drawing on multiple sources of  information,  ranging from academic literature and 
government and industry association reports, to annual reports, press releases and newspaper 
coverage.  We have triangulated the empirical data and present it as chronological narratives 
of the emerging and developing biofuel innovation systems of the U.S. and Brazil respectively.
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4 THE UNITED STATES AND BIOETHANOL
The history of ethanol as a transportation fuel in the U.S. dates back over 100 years to the era 
of automobile design and mass production; Henry Ford built his first car (the quadricycle) to 
run on pure ethanol and the Model T was a flexible fuel vehicle (Keeney, 2009; Solomon et al, 
2007).  Petrol became the dominant fuel in the 1920s, primarily because of the relatively low 
price of oil due to plentiful supplies, alcohol taxes and feedstock prices (Dimitri and Effland, 
2007).  Ethanol produced from corn was added to petrol to increase octane levels and to 
supplement supplies during the depression and both world wars.  As the price of oil reduced 
again at the end of the Second World War, ethanol use dramatically declined and, from the late 
1940s until the late 1970s, there was virtually no commercial fuel ethanol available anywhere 
in the U.S.  
The late  1970s  /  early  1980s  marks the beginning of  the modern ethanol  industry.   The 
empirical  data  is  presented in  three phases  corresponding with  the significant  changes  in 
production shown in Figure 1.  The first phase explores the emergence and steady expansion 
of the modern U.S. bioethanol industry (1978 -2000).  The second phase discusses the factors 
instrumental in the rapid expansion of the industry (2000 – 2005).  Finally, we discuss what 
new trends are emerging in the US biofuels industry (2005 onwards).
4.1 Emergence and steady expansion (1978-2000)
The  re-emergence  of  the  U.S.  ethanol  industry  in  the  late  1970s  was  stimulated  by  the 
changing international economic and political landscape.  Historical interest in ethanol as a 
transportation  fuel  corresponds  with  periods  of  war  and fluctuating  supplies  of  oil  (NSEA, 
2009).  This relationship between domestic and energy security was emphasised by a number 
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Figure  1: Historical US Ethanol Production – created from data provided by the Renewable 
Fuels Association, 2008
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of high profile events in the 1970s; the first of which was the Arab Oil Embargo (1973).  The 
embargo lasted a year and quadrupled the price of oil, exposing the vulnerability of western 
economies to interruptions of supply.  Energy security became a political problem and the US 
government  responded with  a variety  of  initiatives intended to  stimulate  domestic  energy 
production.   
Levels of State intervention increased after the 1979 OPEC oil crisis, the Iranian hostage crisis 
and  the  U.S.  grain  embargo  of  the  Soviet  Union  (The  Ethanol  Fact  Book,  2007).   The 
heightening of Government response mirrored the levels of economic vulnerability perceived in 
the  U.S.  and  interventions  were  designed  to  stimulate  existing  (albeit  dormant)  domestic 
capabilities in ethanol production.  Legislative action (e.g. The Energy Security Act, 1980) was 
fundamental to the emergence of this new ethanol industry and interventions took a variety of 
forms ranging from excise tax credits for biofuel producers and blenders, research funds to 
stimulate  the  development  of  domestic  capacity  and barriers  on  imports.  Ethanol  friendly 
policies and bills during the 1970s and 1980s were strongly supported by the farm and corn 
lobbies.  Subsidies for consumption in this first phase were minor and mainly provided by 
government procurement programmes (Koplow, 2006).
The political articulation of the energy security problem, as well as the defined solution, was 
demonstrated when  President Carter asked the CEO of ADM, a large agricultural processing 
firm, to convert a new alcoholic drink plant into a synfuel plant1. ADM went on to expand their 
construction of new ethanol plants (ADM, 2009) and by the end of the 1980s ADM accounted 
for 80% of total US ethanol production capacity (Financial Times, 2008).  Clearly the emerging 
institutional  configurations  were  influenced  by  existing  capabilities.   The  large  agricultural 
processors were well  positioned in terms of access to feedstock, distribution networks and 
capital equipment to respond to the energy problem articulated by the Government.  By 2000, 
ADM was still the largest US producers accounting for 40% of total capacity this.  The other 
large producers at the time were Minnesota Corn Processors 7%, Cargill  6% and Williams 
Energy 5%.  42% of total US ethanol production capacity was highly fragmented amongst 
small companies with less than 100mgy2 capacity3.  The prominence of small producers was 
facilitated by the relatively large scale of agricultural farms in the US and the formation of 
farmer cooperatives, relatively cheap ethanol production techniques and federal incentives to 
support small producers.  
4.2 Rapid expansion (2000-2005)
The rapid expansion of the US ethanol industry was triggered by the specification of a new 
ecological problem for the biofuel innovation system to solve.  The 1999 decision in California 
to  ban  the  fuel  additive  methyl  tertiary  butyl  ether  (MTBE)  addressed  concerns  about 
groundwater contamination (DOE, 2009; Solomon  et al, 2007).  In  2000, the Environment 
Protection  Agency  recommended  that  MTBE should  be  phased out  nationally  and  in  2004 
California,  New  York  and  Connecticut  switched  from  MTBE  to  ethanol. This  created  an 
immediate market for ethanol in a relatively short time. This initial rise in demand (and the 
development of the modern dry mill) had two main outcomes on the supply side.  Firstly, it 
gave a boost to the rural economy.  Secondly, a new type of organisation (dedicated biofuel 
firms) entered the market between 2000 and 2003; for example VeraSun and Aventine.  These 
firms focused on producing ‘first generation’4 bioethanol from corn and played a pivotal role in 
1 ADM were the main manufacturer of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) and ethanol is another product of the corn wet 
milling process.  An aggressive lobbying effort was undertaken by ADM who were seeking additional markets for the 
products of their mills (Keeney, 2009). This activity preceeded the intervention by President Carter
2 Million Gallons per Year (mgy)
3 These figures are calculated from Renewable Fuels Association data.
4 Discussions of biofuel technologies are typically framed in terms of generations.  This can lead to some confusion, 
since it fails to differentiate between the different phases of biofuel production and end product (NFCC, 2007) and 
poses the problem of how to establish the dividing lines between 2ndm 3 rd and 4th generations.  A better framework is 
one that distinguishes between innovation in feedstocks, processing and the end product on the one hand and between 
technologies as commercialised, prototype (i.e. field trials or demonstration plants) or laboratory status on the other 
(McMeekin  et al, 2010).  In this paper, and in relation to the U.S., we refer to bioethanol production from corn by 
fermentation  as  first  generation.   By  second  generation  we  mean  the  production  of  lignocellulosic  inputs  by 
thermochemical  or  fermentation processes,  possibly relying on biotechnology.  We do not discuss other types of 
biofuel,  e.g.  biodiesel,  in  this  papers  as the  primary  focus  by  the  US Government has  been on bioethanol  and 
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‘scaling-up’ the US’s bioethanol capacity, exiting the market as the focus shifted to cellulosic 
ethanol.  
In addition to this discrete environmental issue, concerns about energy security continued to 
be an important driver of the US ethanol industry.  The US trade deficit in crude oil rose from 
$27 billion in 1987 to $100 billion in 2002  and in 2001 the cost of maintaining a military 
presence in the Middle East exceeded $50 billion per year (The Ethanol Factbook, 2007).  The 
location  of  reserves  in  unstable,  and  often  unfriendly,  regions  was  a  huge  political  and 
economic issue in the U.S..  The Twin Tower bombings in September 2001 (9/11) and the 
resulting ‘War on Terror’ further increased concerns about US dependence on imported crude 
oil.   The  political  and  economic  importance  of  the  energy  security  issue,  combined  with 
environmental concerns, is demonstrated by the increasing number of new incentives and laws 
passed each year in the US.  These increased from 31 in 2003 to 101 in 2007 (Financial Times, 
2008).  There are too many to review here, suffice to say these laws continued the trends 
outlined in phase 1 (tax incentives, tariffs, grants and loans) and increased in intensity.  The 
2000 Biomasss R&D Act (Biomass R&D, 2009) marked a change in government intervention, 
and signalled renewed support of R&D activity.  This act instructed the DOE and the USDA to 
integrate their biomass R&D and initiated a program to develop technologies and feedstocks 
for  bio-based fuels.   The resulting  Biomass  R&D Initiative  signalled a period  of  increased 
Government investment.  
4.3 Continued  expansion  and  the  new  technological  frontier  (2005 
onwards)
In  2005  the  Energy  Policy  Act  (EPA) was  passed.  This  is  the  most  significant  legislation 
affecting the demand side.  The EPA established the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) which 
mandated the annual use of 7.5 billion gallons per year of renewable fuels in the U.S. fuel 
supply by the year 2012.  The EPA was motivated by energy security concerns but shaped by 
competing concerns about environmental quality and economic growth.  Proposals to allow oil 
and gas production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) were blocked but so were 
proposals  to  restrict  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  and  increase  car  fuel  economy 
standards (Holt and Glover, 2006, p10).  The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) in 
2007, or the President's "Twenty in Ten" challenge, built on the EPA and called for a 20 percent 
reduction in oil  use by 2010. The EISA increased the mandated minimum level  of  use of 
renewable fuels in the RFS from 5.4 billion gallons in 2005 to 9.0 billion gallons per year in 
2008, further increasing to 36 billion gallons per year in 2022.  The 2007 Act also requires the 
increased use of “advanced” biofuels (e.g. cellulosic ethanol and biomass-based biodiesel) with 
21 billion gallons of the mandated 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel required to come from 
advanced biofuels by 2022.  These Acts secured a market for the ethanol industry and clearly 
provided a strategic research direction.  Energy security remained the primary problem as 
demonstrated by the two controversial provisions that were not included in the enacted law; 
the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the repeal of tax subsidies for oil and gas 
(Sissine,  2007).   The  formulation  of  these  acts  demonstrates  how  the  government  has 
responded to a reverse salient and the related critical problems, and in doing so has structured 
a technological space for the discovery of solutions.  The reverse salient in question involved 
both environmental and social concerns, specifically around climate change mitigation and the 
use of food commodities for fuel production.  This became most prominent in the public and 
political  responses in 2008 when  the Searchinger  et al (2008) article on indirect land use 
change  (ILUC)  raised  concerns  about  the  environmental  impact  of  biofuel  production, 
particularly first generation corn-to-ethanol.  This article was preceded by corn price spikes 
and food vs. fuel concerns.  In 2006, the price of corn was below $3.00/bushel, by 2008 the 
corn price was averaging $5.50/bushel (Keeney, 2009).  This clearly has an impact on the price 
of bioethanol too5.  Although environmental and climate change concerns have shaped policy 
(see CAST, 2006), for example the EISA requires that biofuels achieve a 20% reduction in 
GHGs, the primary political debate at the time of these legislative changes revolved around 
lignocellulosics. 
5 The vulnerability of corn supply is shown on Graph A where the dip in ethanol production (1995-1996) is the result of 
a poor corn crop and the doubling of prices.  
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energy security and the production capacity potential of the existing corn-ethanol regime.  The 
increasing political  importance of the energy security problem is demonstrated by a  move 
away  from traditional  supply  side  interventions  to  a  more  directive  (and systemic)  policy 
approach to guarantee a market for advanced biofuels.  The rapidly expanding biofuel system 
seeking to solve the energy security problem suddenly faced the reverse salients of how the 
system impacted on climate change and food shortages.  Developing a way to use agricultural 
residues and other  waste streams emerged as the critical  problem to be solved,  relieving 
pressures on further land use change and competition between fuel and food.
The  rapid  expansion  period  of  ‘scaling-up’  industrial  capacity  for  first  generation  biofuels 
overlaps with a period of increased R&D in advanced biofuels, initially marked by the 2000 
Biomass R&D Act.  Cellulosic ethanol was identified as the most viable, and quick, solution to 
the energy security problem and R&D in this area has been strongly promoted by government 
policy  (Herrera,  2006).  Cellulosic  ethanol  could also potentially  resolve emerging concerns 
about negative environmental impacts from biofuel production (Eggert, 2007) and food vs fuel 
competition.   The  Biomass  R&D Initiative  promoted  the  development  of  cellulosic  ethanol 
capabilities  and  innovative  activity  was  directed  towards  two  major  reverse  salients;  1) 
developing better feedstocks (by genetically altering seeds) and 2) more efficient conversion 
processes (using biotechnology to create enzymes able to break down lignin efficiently).  The 
Biomass Program outlines a number of explicit strategies for achieving a commercially viable 
cellulosic ethanol industry, including promoting collaborative R&D in feedstock and conversion 
technologies,  supporting  public-private  partnerships  to  demonstrate  large  scale  integrated 
biomass systems, and supporting activities to accelerate commercialisation.  
State intervention has had a significant influence on the biofuels innovation system in the U.S. 
R&D support, combined with a guaranteed market, has facilitated public science activity and 
stimulated significant changes in industrial structure.  For example, there has been a variety of 
new entrants into the biofuels industry.  Firstly, agricultural-biotechnology companies, such as 
Monsanto,  Syngenta  and  DuPont;  Secondly,  biotechnology-biofuels  companies,  such  as 
Verenium, Coskata and Iogen; and thirdly, the oil companies, such as Conoco-Phillips, Shell 
and Chevron.   All  have collaborative  relationships  with  industry  and  academia.   Both  the 
existing agricultural-processors and the newly entered agricultural-biotechnology firms have an 
interest in feedstocks and processing, and are actively collaborating in both areas.  Mergers 
and collaborations with the biotech-biofuels firms tend to focus on combining complementary 
capabilities  in  biotech  enzymes  and  cellulosic  ethanol  technologies  with  the  intention  of 
creating vertically integrated cellulosic ethanol companies.
5 BRAZIL AND BIOETHANOL
The pre-1970s historical development of the Brazilian ethanol industry shares many similarities 
with the emergence of the US industry.  Ethanol was considered a suitable fuel for vehicles 
from the turn of the twentieth century, dropping out of favour in the 1920s as the price of oil 
declined yet receiving significant state attention in the 1930s as the price of oil increased again 
(Nunberg, 1986).  However oil prices began to drop again after the Second World War and by 
the 1970s ethanol production was minimal.  The 1970s marks the beginning of the modern 
Brazilian ethanol industry.  
The empirical data is presented in three phases corresponding with the significant changes in 
production  shown  in  Figure  2.   During  the  first  phase,  in  contrast  to  the  U.S.,  ethanol 
production increased rapidly from 1976 to 1985.  During the second phase, between 1985-
1997, we see a similar period of slow growth followed by a sharp drop in production levels until 
2000.  The third phase after 2003 is one of continued rapid expansion, and by 2005 Brazilian 
and US levels of ethanol production converge over the 15,000 million gallons mark.
5.1 Emergence and rapid expansion (1975–1985)  
The  re-emergence  of  the  Brazilian  ethanol  industry  in  the  1970s  was  stimulated  by  the 
changing international economic and political landscape, and shaped by the existing domestic 
situation.  In 1973, Brazil was importing four-fifths of its oil (Winfield, 2008) and the oil shocks 
discussed in the U.S. case study had significant implications for Brazil.  In addition to general 
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economic dependence on oil, the newly industrialising, militarily run, country had a growing 
car  production  industry  (central  to  Brazil’s  economic  growth)  and  increasing  levels  of  car 
ownership. The military government were highly motivated to maintain economic and political 
stability and responded to rising oil prices by investing in domestic production and increasing 
foreign debt.  At the same time the Brazilian economy was experiencing a sugar export crisis 
due to the low world sugar price.  The use of sugarcane as a feedstock was fundamental to the 
particular trajectory followed by the ethanol industry in Brazil.  The importance of sugarcane to 
Brazil  as  an  agricultural  commodity  has  shaped  sugar  policy  throughout  the  century.  For 
example,  during  the  1960’s  the  government  invested  in  modernising  the  domestic  sugar 
industry to compete in world markets, doubling the capacity of the sector during the early 
1970s  (Lehtonen, 2007).  This contributed to Brazils sugar processing capacity, which was 
necessary  for  the  emergence  of  the  domestic  biofuel  industry.    In  the  early  1970s  the 
burgeoning  domestic  production  capacity,  the  weakness  of  the  world  sugar  market,  the 
accelerating economic crisis, and the growing emphasis on alcohol as a petroleum substitute, 
were the main factors influencing the emergence of the Brazilian ethanol industry (Nunberg, 
1986).  Domestic economic concerns, existing industrial capacity, new economic opportunities 
and a powerful sugarcane lobby (Nass  et al, 2007) were significant factors influencing the 
political framing and articulation of industrial and energy problems.  These issues converged 
into a ‘bioethanol produced from sugar cane’ solution.
Figure 2: World and Regional Ethanol Production 1975-2003 (millions of gallons) – sourced 
from Vessia (2006)
The  articulation  of  this  solution  by  the  Brazilian  government  was  embodied  by  the 
establishment of the Proalcool Program in 1975. This programme was designed to promote 
national  growth,  reduce  regional  disparities,  and  address  energy  dependency  issues  by 
coordinating the domestic production and consumption of ethanol.  The Proalcool Program can 
be split into two phases; Phase 1 (1975-1979) and Phase 2 (1979-1985).  In the first phase 
the program concentrated on producing anhydrous alcohol for blending with petrol.  A 20% 
ethanol: 80% petrol target ratio was set as this was possible with the existing stock of cars. 
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Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, was mandated to purchase a guaranteed amount of 
ethanol  from  producers,  then  blend  and  distribute  the  petrol-ethanol  mix.   This  level  of 
intervention by the State was enabled by the pre-existing economic structure, including State 
ownership of Petrobras, and the concentration and centralisation of the sugarcane industry 
under the Instituto de Azucar e Alcool (IAA).   The State in Brazil directly intervened in the 
emergence of the innovation system around the articulated problem, and was a core actor in 
the mobilisation of the system.  Emphasis was placed on increasing agricultural production, 
and  modernising  and  constructing  production  plants.   The  government  operated  a  credits 
scheme for distillery construction and by 1979 there were 104 ethanol distilleries in operation. 
The price received by ethanol producers was also set close to the average costs of production, 
thus  insulating  producers  from  market  fluctuations.  In  addition,  the  IAA  implemented  a 
national  agricultural  research  programme  to  promote  the  development  of  new  sugarcane 
varieties.  This research accelerated the improvement in sugar cane yields by approximately 10 
tonnes per hectare; to 60.5 tonnes in 1982.  
The second oil crisis in 1979 stimulated expansion of the Proalcool program.  The blending of 
anhydrous ethanol with petrol had been so successful that maximum capacity was restricted 
by  engine  design,  sugar  and  ethanol  supplies.   Phase  2  of  the  program coordinated  the 
production of hydrous alcohol for use in engines designed to run on pure ethanol.   Initial 
efforts to develop a dedicated engine capable of running on pure ethanol were State controlled 
and conducted at  the Centro de  Tecnologia Aeronautica (CTA)  in  Sao Paulo  (Goldemberg, 
2008).   The State persuaded multinational car producers located in Brazil to commercialise 
this technology and invest in developing their production capacity.  The involvement of the car 
industry was essential  for  the continuation of  the programme and the government signed 
contracts with Fiat, VW, Mercedes-Benz, GM and Toyota to produce 250,000 cars by 1980 and 
350,000 by 1982 (Sandalow, 2006).  The State simultaneously stimulated consumption by 
providing tax incentives for the purchase of cars run on hydrous ethanol and mandating that 
all government vehicles were ethanol fuelled.   Further incentives were created in the early 
1980s when the Brazilian government capped the pump price of hydrous alcohol at 64.5% of 
the petrol  price.   Consumers responded by purchasing large numbers of  ethanol  powered 
vehicles and in the mid 1980’s pure ethanol vehicles accounted for 80 percent of all new cars 
sold (Ueki, 2007).  At the point of purchase by the consumer, the relative price of bioethanol 
has remained below petrol throughout the period and for most of the 2000s (De Almeida et al, 
2007).
5.2 Industry stagnation (1985-2002)
This phase of rapid growth is followed by a phase of stability, or stagnation.  In 1985-86 there 
was a sharp drop in the international price of oil which coincided with economic depression and 
the  transition  to  a  civilian  government.  Production  subsidies  for  the  ethanol  sector  were 
withdrawn from 1986 (Lehtonen, 2007).  Consumption subsidies were maintained in order to 
minimise the risk of defaults on existing public loans. Supplies of ethanol were interrupted in 
1988 when an increase in the world sugar price motivated many sugar producers to divert 
their crops to the world market.  This resulted in a domestic fuel crisis and the abandonment of 
pure-ethanol engine vehicles by car producers and consumers.  Ethanol producers responded 
to the economic depression, reduction in demand and fall in world oil prices by reducing R&D 
budgets.
Graph B shows an initial drop in ethanol production followed by fluctuating levels between 
1998-2002.  Since the creation of the Proalcool Program, the prices of fuel, and the prices 
received by ethanol producers, have been set by the Brazilian government.  Prior to 1985, the 
price was set to correspond with the cost of production.  After 1985, this price was set below 
the average cost of production in an attempt by the federal government to control inflation 
(Goldemberg et al, 2004).  Consumption subsidies for the ethanol sector ended in 1997 as part 
of  the  liberalisation  program.   This  had  an  immediate  impact  on  production  levels  which 
generally  dropped  as  subsidies  were  withdrawn,  prices  fluctuated  and  stocks  of  ethanol 
declined.  Minimum blending policies and import tariffs were maintained ensuring that ethanol 
retained a market and the focus in the sector shifted to R&D.
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5.3 Rapid re-expansion (2003 onwards)
The relatively low, but stable, level of Brazilian ethanol production ensured by mandatory 20% 
ethanol-petrol  blending,  maintained  the  ethanol  industry  through  a  period  of  reduced 
government support and adverse economic conditions.  However, in 2003 domestic ethanol 
production began to rapidly increase.  The renewed interest in ethanol as a transportation fuel 
was the result of a number of inter-related social, political and economic factors.  The US had 
begun investing heavily  in  ethanol  production  and global  economic  growth increased the 
demand for  oil,  pushing the price  of  oil  up from 2003.  World  wide consensus  to  reduce 
greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  and  dependence  on  Middle  East  oil  imports  led  many 
countries to explore biofuels as one technological solution.  This created a potential export 
market  for  Brazilian  ethanol.  The  Brazilian  government  framed  the  global  climate  change 
problem as an economic opportunity. In 2007 the Government explicitly aspired to substitute 
10  percent  of  the  global  use  of  petrol  with  Brazilian  ethanol  exports  within  2  decades 
(Lehtonen, 2007).  In 2008, Brazilian ethanol accounted for over half of all ethanol exported 
worldwide  and  the  ethanol  program  in  Brazil  had  replaced  approximately  1.5%  petrol 
consumed worldwide by 2008 (Goldemberg, 2008).
The introduction of the flexible fuel vehicle (FFV) to Brazil was fundamental to the expansion of 
the ethanol industry.  In 2001 the Brazilian government agreed to offer the preferential tax 
rate applied to pure ethanol cars to flex-fuel vehicles (Lehtonen, 2007).  Ford launched their 
prototype in 2002 and VW entered the market in 2003.  Graph C shows how successful the 
penetration of the FFV is in Brazil.  At the beginning of 2006 approximately 75% of new cars 
manufactured in Brazil were FFVs (Moreira, 2006; Marris, 2006).
Figure 3: Evolution of the production of light vehicles (thousands) and the Total Brazilian 
Fleet (2007) – sourced from Romanelli (2008)
The FFV is  capable  of  running on pure petrol,  pure ethanol  or  any blend between.   This 
increased the substitutability between the fuels for consumers (Hira and de Oliveira, 2009) and 
the substitutability between sugar and ethanol markets for producers.  The resultant increase 
in the domestic  market  for  bioethanol  enabled by the success of  the FFV has resulted in 
conflicts  between  domestic  and  export  use.  The  government  recently  enacted  legislation 
lowering the required percentage of ethanol in petrol blends from 25-20 percent to ensure that 
both domestic demand and export opportunities can be met.  This further demonstrates the 
dominance of the economic development problem over that of climate change.
New reverse salients have emerged and been articulated as critical problems as the system 
has evolved.  In addition to infrastructure constraints to international distribution (an issue 
addressed by the State  and key firms such as Petrobas),  the vision of  Brazil  as  a major 
exporter demands a major increase in the volume of bioethanol produced.  This reverse salient 
has been articulated as a series of critical problems related to increasing sugar cane yields and 
improving  processing  capabilities.    Research  based  on  traditional  methods  has  been 
complimented by biotechnology approaches.  Quite speculative genomic science initiated in 
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2000 (Harvey and McMeekin, 2005) has created the possibility for new transgenic sugarcane 
varieties.  This has seen the emergence of new domestic biotechnology firms spun-out of the 
government research programmes, for example Allelyx in plant genomics and Canavialis in 
sugar cane breeding.   Sugarcane refining productivity has increased dramatically over the 
past  decades and Dedini,  the dominant equipment provider in this sector,  has occupied a 
central position in the sugar refining innovation trajectory.  Dedini have developed a process 
enabling  the  production  of  bioethanol  from bagasse  and  straw6 with  the  aim of  doubling 
refining productivity.  A commercial demonstration plant, capable of producing 5,000 litres per 
day, has been in operation since 2003, through a joint venture between Dedini, COPERSUCAR 
(the cooperative of sugar growers) and FAPESP, the Sao Paulo State government research 
funder.   During the 30 year period since ProAlcool ethanol production has multiplied by 30, 
yield per hectare has increased by 60% and production costs have declined by 75% (Nass et 
al, 2007).  As in the US case we see how the innovation system involves the coordinated 
action of public and private actors in market and non-market modes of interaction.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A central issue addressed in this paper is the framing and articulation of ‘problems’ by the 
State, and the subsequent mechanisms employed to incentivise system emergence to address 
these problems.  Understanding innovation systems as problem orientated provides dynamism 
and direction to the system.  The system is understood as goal seeking, evolving towards 
articulated objectives.  However, as previously emphasised, surprisingly little has been said 
about how problems themselves are constructed.  The biofuel industries of the U.S. and Brazil 
re-emerged  during  the  1970’s  in  response  to  strategic  interventions  by  their  national 
governments intended to mobilise innovation systems around a specific problem.  The case 
studies clearly demonstrate how global events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, can be 
framed in different ways, and that this framing is dependent on multiple technical, economic 
and political factors.  
In order to develop our understanding of how innovation systems emerge and evolve, we draw 
on Hughes (1983) concept of the reverse salient.  This refers to the complex of economic, 
social, political and technological factors, which at a given point in time inhibit further growth 
of the system.  The reverse salient is resolved into a technical problem that can be addressed 
by the innovation system.  When there is a failure to solve a major problem in the old system, 
a new system or new subsystem emerges.  In the U.S. the reliance on Middle Eastern oil was 
perceived  as  a  major  problem  with  the  oil  system  stimulating  the  emergence  of  a  new 
domestic liquid fuel system.  As oil prices reduced and supplies stabilised, political interest 
declined, and ethanol production capacity experienced marginal growth.  In comparison, the 
international oil price shocks threatened economic growth and political stability in Brazil.  The 
military-run,  newly  industrialising  country  had  a  growing  car  manufacturing  industry  and 
increasing levels of car ownership.  Simultaneously, Brazils sugar industry was experiencing an 
export crisis.  The sugar and car industries were of strategic importance to the wider Brazilian 
economy, complete with powerful lobbies.  Economic stability was critical to maintaining the 
political  regime.   Developing  cane-to-ethanol  capacity  provided  another  market  for  the 
powerful sugar industry, fuel for increased domestic car ownership, which in turn facilitated 
growth of the domestic car manufacturing industry and reduced dependence on imported oil.  
The biofuels system in Brazil emerged to solve a problem of economic and political stability 
that could not be solved by the existing oil system at that time.  In comparison, the biofuels 
industry in the U.S. emerged to solve a problem of energy security, but the oil price hikes of 
the 1970s were temporary and the energy security problem reduced in importance.  Without 
continued political support and interest from the strong agricultural lobby the biofuels industry 
did not re-emerge as rapidly as in Brazil. The relative importance of the unresolved major 
problem influenced the momentum of system emergence.  
In  both  cases  the  evolution  of  problems,  or  problem  sequences,  provides  direction  and 
momentum to the emerging innovation system.  Innovative activity is concentrated around 
6 The DHR (Dedini  rapid hydrolysis)  process converts  cellulosic  matter  into sugars,  which can be fermented and 
distilled to produce bioethanol.
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reverse salients which become defined as a series of critical problems.  Once critical problems 
are solved the system boundaries evolve (or advance) and other reverse salients emerge.  For 
example,  the  successful  scaling-up of  biofuels  production capacity  in  the  U.S.  altered  the 
problem  space.   Concerns  about  the  environmental  impact  of  biofuels  (especially  GHG 
emissions  from ILUC)  coincided  with  corn  price  spikes  and  debates  about  the  production 
capacity potential of the existing corn-ethanol regime.  These concerns combined to form a 
reverse  salient  limiting  further  system  development.  The  framing  and  articulation  of  the 
problem changed as the system evolved, new knowledge came to light and the problem was 
renegotiated.  The US government responded by incentivising and mandating cellulosic ethanol 
production and subsequent innovative activity was directed towards this goal.  Inherently, in a 
dynamic  and  complex  system,  problems  can  never  be  fully  resolved,  partial  solutions  to 
problems change the problem space resulting in altered understanding of their nature.  Thus 
reverse salients, and their related critical  problems, change and influence how the system 
evolves, the rate of its expansion and how it is constituted.
The Brazilian sugarcane-to-ethanol production regime is characterised as highly productive and 
efficient,  and  no  reverse  salient  emerged  in  the  same way.   Indeed,  such  has  been  the 
momentum of the Brazilian biofuel system that it is re-directed away from economic stability 
towards further expansion beyond its initial national boundary through the development of 
export markets.  A potential export market for Brazilian biofuels was created by the US focus 
on energy security  and investments in  domestic  ethanol  production,  as well  as the global 
intention to reduce GHG emissions.  The export opportunity was coherent with the original 
economic development agenda and enabled by the demand driven capacity stimulated by the 
introduction  of  domestic  flexible-fuel  vehicles.   Changing  market  conditions  provided  an 
opportunity for  expansion and an altered understanding of  the problem stimulated further 
efforts to increase the volume of bioethanol produced for export.  Innovative activity directed 
at solving this reverse salient has been concentrated on major innovations in agriculture and 
refining technologies.  In Brazil, new knowledge, especially speculative genomic science, has 
presented novel opportunities for solving these critical problems.  
The  framing  and  articulation  of  problems  occurs  within  a  context  of  relative  institutional 
stability and the specific  modes of economic governance instituted in different  regions.  In 
Brazil, prior to 1985, the governing military regime directly intervened in both the supply and 
demand sides of the biofuels industry.  The Proalcool programme provided a comprehensive, 
system-wide, set of policies to induce growth.  Petrobras, the state controlled oil company, was 
a major coordinating firm, despite initial resistance.  In comparison to the direct command and 
control approach of Brazil, market-based instruments were employed initially in the U.S. with 
policies  based  on  market  failure  justifications,  e.g.  R&D  tax  incentives  and  tariffs.   The 
Renewable Fuels Standard in 2005 introduced demand side mandates and signified a change of 
style in intervention reflecting the increased strategic importance given to the energy security 
problem.   The  oil  firms,  and  dedicated  biofuel  firms,  only  entered  the  system  to  find 
substitutes for MTBE and in response to blending mandates.  The more direct (and system 
orientated) style of State intervention that arose in the US demonstrates a move away from 
the ‘liberal market’ orthodoxy.  This is particularly interesting as the U.S. is regarded as the 
archetypal example of a successful liberal innovative economy.  This rhetoric is clearly different 
from the reality.
Dominant physical and social technologies create institutional lock-in, or path dependency.  In 
Hughes language, momentum provided inertia to the older well established system.  In the 
first two phases in Brazil and the U.S. there was little tension between the incumbent firms in 
the oil industry and the slowly emerging biofuels trajectory.  The oil companies in the U.S. 
have been relatively inactive.  In Brazil the initial resistance of Petrobras was overcome by 
direct government ownership.  Due to high levels of mandatory blending the oil firm and the 
emergent biofuel system have co-existed in an almost symbiotic relationship.  During the third 
phase there have been increasing tensions between the old and new systems in Brazil and the 
U.S..  Petrobras, already with significant biofuels capability in-house, created a fully owned 
subsidiary.   In  the  U.S.  oil  firms  have  begun  constructing  networks  around  themselves 
involving public science institutes and dedicated biotech-biofuel firms in order to develop in-
house capacity.  The momentum or inertia in the incumbent system stifled the emergence of a 
new competing innovation system.  Government intervention, in response to a major problem 
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in the old system, has been a central driver of the new innovation systems in both countries.  
The  emergence  of  the  biofuels  industries  in  the  U.S.  and  Brazil  are  probably  the  most 
prominent  recent  examples  of  governments  intervening to  ‘solve’  large  scale  political  and 
ecological problems.  The State has clearly played a crucial coordinating role in both innovation 
systems, though the style and level of intervention has varied spatially and temporally.  In 
both countries the emergence of a biofuel industry was primarily motivated by energy security 
and economic growth rather than environmental concerns, which have tended to shape the 
formulation  of  solutions  rather  than  the  framing  of  problems.   However,  climate  change 
mitigation is a problem of unparalleled scale, associated with significant market failure.  Any 
solutions  will  require  the  development  of  innovative  capacity  and  corresponding  shifts  in 
industrial organisation.  As industry has little or no incentive to self organise this necessitates a 
strong coordinating role for government.   In light of this, as ecological problems intensify we 
might expect to see an increase in state intervention in innovation systems.  
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